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PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AFTER
GOSS v. LOPEZ
The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Consti-
tution prohibit the government and its administrative agencies from
depriving an individual "of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law."'  The fundamental purpose of due process is to secure the
individual against arbitrary action by government and place him under
the protection of the law.2 Thus, one aspect of the prohibition is to
prevent the deprivation of an individual's protected interest without
some sort of minimal procedural protection. For example, prior to the
withdrawal of welfare benefits, the government must give the recipient
timely and adequate notice which details the reasons for the proposed
termination, the right to present his own arguments and evidence, and
the right to confront and cross-examine any adverse witnesses. 3 The
type of hearing required in each instance will be a function of the
governmental and the individual interests at stake. In any event, how-
ever, some procedure must be afforded, "for it is procedure that marks
much of the difference between rule by law and rule by fiat."4
The interests protected and the procedures required by the due
process clause have been the subject of continual constitutional evolve-
ment. The latest Supreme Court pronouncement in the area is Goss v.
Lopez.5 The case arose when nine students temporarily suspended
from their high schools during a period of widespread student unrest in
the Columbus, Ohio, public school system in February and March of
1971, brought an action against the Columbus Board of Education and
various school administrators under section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act." An Ohio statute7 gave school principals the authority to suspend
1. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
2. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974); Dent v. West Virginia, 129
U.S. 114, 123 (1889).
3. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970).
4. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971).
5. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
7. Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.66 (Page 1972) provides in part:
The superintendent of schools of a city or exempted village, the executive
head of a local kchool district, or the principal of a public school may suspend
a pupil from school for not more than ten days. Such superintendent or
executive head may expel a pupil from school. Such superintendent, execu-
tive head, or principal shall within twenty-four hours after the time of ex-
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pupils for a period not exceeding ten days without requiring any hear-
ing. The complaint alleged that this procedure violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment by depriving the plaintiffs of their
right to an education. The students sought a declaration that the statute
was unconstitutional and sought to enjoin the school officials from
issuing future suspensions under the statute and to require them to
expunge any references to the suspensions from the school records. A
three-judge federal district court found the statute in question to be in
violation of the due process clause and granted full relief to the plain-
tiffs. 8
Following an appeal by the school administrators, the Supreme
Court affirmed the lower court's opinion. The five Justices comprising
the majority held that the right to a public education provided by Ohio
law9 was a protected property right under the fourteenth amendment
which could not be taken away for misconduct without observance of
minimum procedural due process requirements.'0 After concluding
that "[a] 10-day suspension from school is not de minimis . . .and
may not be imposed in complete disregard of the Due Process
Clause,"" the Court held that in this situation due process requires that
the student be given oral or written notice of the charges against him,
and, if he denies them, an explanation by the school official of the evi-
dence against him, and the opportunity to present his own version of the
story.12  The Court stated that, as a general rule, notice and hearing
pulsion or suspension, notify the parent or guardian of the child, and the
clerk of the board of education in writing of such expulsion or suspension in-
cluding the reasons therefor.
8. Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
9. Omo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 3313.48 (Page 1972) ("The board of education of each
city . . . shall provide for the free education of the youth of school age within the dis-
trict under its jurisdiction, at such places as will be most convenient for the attendance
of the largest number thereof."). See id. § 3313.64.
10. 419 U.S. at 574. The Supreme Court's treatment of the students' interest in ed-
ucation primarily as a protected property interest contrasts sharply with the district
court's assessment that the state-created right to education was a liberty interest pro-
tected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Lopez v. Williams, 372
F. Supp. 1279, 1299-1300 (S.D. Ohio 1973). The district court devoted only a brief
footnote, id. at 1299 n.16, to the property interest analysis ultimately adopted by the
Supreme Court, while the Supreme Court touched sparingly on the issue of harm to the
students' liberty interest without reference to the fact that the lower court had actually
based its decision on this ground. 419 U.S. at 574-75. It is unclear from the Court's
opinion whether the damage to liberty results solely from the act of suspension (damage
to student's standing with his fellow pupils and his teacher), or from the charges appear-
ing on the student's record (interference with later opportunities for higher education
and employment), or both.
11. 419 U.S. at 576.
12, Id. at 581.
[Vol. 1976:409
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
should precede the suspension, but agreed with the lower court that in
some extreme situations, such as where a student's continued presence
poses a danger to persons or property or threatens tot disrupt the
academic process, prior notice and hearing cannot be insisted upon. In
these instances, the Court held, the necessary procedural safeguards
"should follow as soon as practicable."'1 3
While the Goss opinion is worded to confine itself solely to the fact
situation faced, that of short-term school suspensions, it is likely to have
a broad impact in the administrative law field. Goldberg v. Kelly' 4
marked the beginning of a due process expansion that extended the
hearing requirements into areas of executive or administrative actions
which were once the exclusive domain of administrators exercising
unchallenged discretion. This expansion was later slowed by Supreme
Court decisions which restricted the coverage of the due process clause
to those situations where the government threatened to deprive an
individual of interests "already acquired in specific benefits,"1' 5 threat-
ened an individual's good name, or interfered with his freedom to take
advantage of employment opportunities.' 6 Goss, however, has revital-
ized the expansionary trend by apparently eliminating the floor below
which no hearing is required. This Note will explore the probable
extent of that revitalization. First, the effects of Goss on the scope of
the interests protected by the Constitution will be discussed. The
procedural safeguards which the Court held necessary under the Goss
facts will then be examined, and the impact of this holding on the
procedures which may be required in other situations will be evaluated.
PROTECTED INTERESTS
The Supreme Court has on numerous occasions repeated the ob-
vious qualification that the requirements of procedural due process
apply only to deprivations of "life, liberty, or property" as those terms
are used in the fifth and fourteenth amendments.1" The Court's assess-
ment of the range of interests thus protected within the "liberty" and
"property" categories, however, has not always been uniform. At one
stage, a distinction was drawn between those governmental benefits
13. Id. at 582-83. For a discussion of those situations where the Supreme Court
has approved post-deprivation hearings, see note 88 infra.
14. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
15. See notes 24-28 infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 58-59 infra and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972); Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971).
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characterized as "rights" and those which were mere "privileges."' 8 Due
process guarantees were held not to apply to deprivations of privileges,
on the theory that the state or federal government could deny the benefit
altogether. In its more recent decisions, the Court has rejected this
"wooden distinction' 1 9 and expanded the membership of the classes
of protected interests. The Court has made it clear that the class of
protected property interests extends well beyond actual ownership of
real estate and personalty, 20 and the class of protected liberty interests
beyond mere freedom from bodily restraint.21
Property Interests
In the leading pre-Goss decision of Board of Regents v. Roth,22 the
Supreme Court, while purporting to reject rigid and formalistic restric-
tions, placed a definite limit on the range of interests protected within
the property classification. The Court began its analysis by explaining
that only the nature of the interest at stake was to be examined, and not
its weight, in determining whether the requirements of due process
would apply at all.23 In other words, the competing private and govern-
mental interests were not to be balanced in making this initial determi-
nation. Apparently aware of the great expansion of protected interests
which would result from the unmitigated rejection of this balancing
approach, the Court went on to limit membership in the property class
itself, stating that the fourteenth amendment procedural protection of
property safeguarded the security of only such interests as "a person has
18. The leading case dealing with the right-privilege distinction is Bailey v. Richard-
son, 182 F.2d 46, 57-58 (D.C. Cir. 1950), afrd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S.
918 (1951) (federal employee can be dismissed at will by appointing authority). See
also McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892) (no
constitutional right to be policeman). Supreme Court cases adopting this same rationale
include Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 451 (1954) (practice of medicine
is privilege), and United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950)
(admission of aliens is privilege). See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the
Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HAav. L. Rv. 1439 (1968).
19. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972); accord, Graham v. Rich-
ardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971). The right-
privilege distinction and its subsequent erosion are explored in detail in K. DAvis, AD-
MnIsTRAT LAW Tzxr §§ 7.12, 7.13 (3d ed. 1972).
20. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972); see, e.g., Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535 (1971) (driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (wel-
fare benefits).
21. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,-576 (1972); see, e.g., Stanley v. Illi-
nois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (unwed father entitled to hearing on his fitness as parent
in dependency hearing); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (op-
portunity to practice law).
22. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
23. Id. at 571.
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already acquired in specific benefits. 24  Drawing upon prior case law
to identify certain attributes of protectable property interests, the Court
observed: "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly
must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have
more than a unilateral expectation. . . . He must. . . have a legiti-
mate claim of entitlement to it."25
The distinction which the Court was attempting to draw between a
mere expectancy and a legitimate claim of entitlement is best illustrated
by a comparison of Roth and its companion case, Perry v.
Sindermann.2 6 In Roth, the Court held that a nontenured teacher who
had not been rehired following the expiration of his one-year contract
had no protected interest in reemployment for the next year. In the
absence of a state statute or university rule or policy, the Court conclud-
ed, Roth had no legitimate claim to such employment, and therefore the
requirements of procedural due process did not apply. 7  In Perry,
however, although a nontenured teacher was again involved, the Court
held that the refusal to rehire the teacher without first affording him a
hearing or giving him an explanation may have violated due process
guarantees. The teacher in this case, unlike Roth, claimed more than a
mere expectancy in reemployment. He claimed instead that a de facto
tenure policy arising from rules and understandings officially promul-
gated by the college gave him a legitimate claim of entitlement to job
tenure.
28
24. Id. at 576. The Court gave a number of examples of prior cases where it had
found a benefit safeguarded by procedural due process. See id. at 576-77, citing Gold-
berg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits); Slochower v. Board of Educ.,
350 U.S. 551 (1956) (public college professor holding office under tenure provisions);
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (college professor and staff members hold-
ing office under term contract). The Roth Court also made note of Connell v. Higgin-
botham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971), where the Court held that due process protections ex-
tended to a teacher who, though lacking tenure or a formal contract, was hired under
a clearly implied promise of continuing employment. 408 U.S. at 576-77.
25. 408 U.S. at 577. See generally Comment, Entitlement, Enjoyment, and Due
Process of Law, 1974 Drmu LJ. 89 (discussion and criticism of "entitlement" and
"present enjoyment" doctrines).
26. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
27. 409 U.S. at 578.
28. The plaintiff, Sindermann, had been a teacher in the state college system for
ten years, the last four of which were at a junior college under a series of one-year con-
tracts. Although the college lacked an explicit tenure policy, he offered to prove that
a teacher with his long period of service had 'no less a 'property' interest in continued
employment than a formally tenured teacher at other colleges." 408 U.S. at 601. Reli-
ance was placed upon the policies and practices of the junior college as articulated in
its Faculty Guide in a section entitled 'Teacher Tenure" and upon guidelines promul-
gated by the state board of colleges. The Court agreed that these facts, if proven, would
support the inference of an unwritten "common law" of tenure. Id. at 602. The case
Vol. 1976:4091
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The Court may have qualified this distinction by its subsequent
decision in Arnett v. Kennedy.2 9 Reasoning from the notion, articulat-
ed in Roth, that "property interests. . . are created and their dimen-
sions are defined by existing rules or understandings. . . such as state
law,"30 Arnett suggested that the source of an otherwise legitimate claim
of entitlement might affect its availability. In this case, a nonprobation-
ary federal employee who had been dismissed from his position chal-
lenged the dismissal as violative of due process because he had not been
afforded a trial-type pre-removal hearing. In holding that the dismissal
did not violate due process, a plurality of the Court found that the same
law which granted the governmental employee his statutory entitlement
to government employment from which he could not be removed with-
out "cause" simultaneously restricted that right by providing the means
by which cause was to be determined. "1 Thus, the employee's protecta-
ble right to a government job was qualified by the government's right to
discharge him for cause according to whatever procedures it estab-
lished.32
In addition to the requirement of a legitimate claim of entitlement,
a number of lower courts prior to Goss also required a showing that the
deprivation was serious before the requirements of procedural due
process would apply. Following the Supreme Court's pronouncement
in Goldberg v. Kelly,3 the lower courts would extend procedural pro-
tection only where the individual had sustained a "grievous loss" or
suffered a "serious effect" as a result of governmental action: the
"brutal need" test.34 While some courts did not read Goldberg as
differs substantially from Roth, where the teacher, who had been employed by the uni-
versity for only one year, failed to offer any evidence of a similar state statute or uni-
versity rule or policy securing his interest in reemployment.
29. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
30. 408 U.S. at 577.
31. 416 U.S. at 151-52.
32. The plurality opinion noted that where, as in this instance, the grant of a benefit
is simultaneously tempered by procedural limitations, the recipient must learn to "take
the bitter with the sweet." Id. at 154.
33, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
34. See, e.g., Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority, 433 F.2d 998, 1003 (4th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971) (termination of low-rent housing tenant's
lease); Wright v. Finch, 321 F. Supp. 383, 386 (D.D.C. 1971), vacated sub nor. Rich-
ardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208 (1972) (termination of disability insurance benefits);
Java v. California Dep't of Human Resource Dcv., 317 F. Supp. 875, 878 (N.D. Cal.
1970), af 'd, 402 U.S. 121 (1971) (termination of unemployment insurance benefits).
The court in Anderson v. Finch, 322 F. Supp. 195 (N.D. Ohio 1971), rev'd on other
grounds, 454 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1972), was unable to find that plaintiff had suffered
any "drAconian effect" from denial of Social Security payments and thus rejected her
claim for a pre-termination hearing. See also United States v. Husband R. (Roach),
(Vol. 1976:409
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actually requiring application of this "brutal need" limitation, they
extended the procedural safeguards only after balancing the interests at
stake and determining that the deprivation was sufficiently serious to
override the government's interest in avoiding evidentiary hearings.31
Even after the Supreme Court determined in Roth that only the nature
of the interest at stake should be examined in determining whether due
process applies at all, several lower courts still required a showing of
seriousness.3 6 The approach taken by the First Circuit was typical:
"The stake will be sufficiently large to necessitate some due process if
the consequences of the challenged actions of the state officials are
sufficiently serious to amount to a 'grievous' loss."3' 7
In Goss, the Supreme Court had little trouble in establishing that
the students who had been suspended had legitimate claims of entitle-
ment to a public education. Noting first that local communities were
required under Ohio law to provide free education to individuals of
school age, 8 the Court held that the state, having chosen to extend this
right to an education to such individuals, must recognize their legitimate
entitlement to that education as a property interest.39 The Court also
dismissed the school officials' claim that the due process clause would
come into play only when the deprivation by the state would result in a
"severe detriment or grievous loss" to the individual. Basing its
position on prior case law, it stated that
the length and consequent severity of a deprivation .. . "is not de-
cisive of the basic right" to a hearing of some kind. The Court's view
453 F.2d 1054, 1062-63 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 935 (1972) (no hearing
required when bus operator denied access to area reserved for franchised bus company);
Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1247 (1st Cir. 1970) (no hearing prior to FHA ap-
proval of rent increase).
35. See, e.g., Coral Gables Convalescent Home, Inc. v. Richardson, 340 F. Supp.
646, 649 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (withholding of Medicare payments to recipient nursing home
to recoup amounts claimed overpaid); Wheeler v. Vermont, 335 F. Supp. 856, 861-62
(D. Vt. 1971) (termination of unemployment benefits).
36. See, e.g., Pelisek v. Trevor State Graded School Dist., 371 F. Supp. 1064, 1066
(E.D. Wis. 1974) ("significant interference with his property rights"); Graff v. Nicholl,
370 F. Supp. 974, 981 (N.D. Il. 1974) ("any significant private interest"). Absent
such a finding, the courts were unwilling to apply any procedural safeguards. See, e.g.,
Adams v. Walker, 492 F.2d 1003 (7th Cir. 1974) (removal of political appointee from
state commission); Watson v. Cronin, 384 F. Supp. 652, 658 (D. Colo. 1974) (denial
of press card to former felon).
37. Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280, 1284 (1st Cir. 1973), vacated and re-
manded, 418 U.S. 908, on reconsideration, 510 F.2d 534 (1974), cert. granted, 421 U.S.
1010 (1975); cf. Pregent v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Security, 361 F.
Supp. 782 (D.N.H. 1973), vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 903 (1974).
38. OHIo R v. CoDE ANN. §§ 3313.48, 3313.64 (Page 1972). See note 9 supra.
39. 419 U.S. at 573-74. The Court's approach differed from the district court's
analysis of education as a liberty interest. See note 10 supra.
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has been that as long as a property deprivation is not de minimis, its
gravity is irrelevant to the question whether account must be -taken of
the Due Process Clause.40
Unable to view a ten-day suspension from school as a de minimis
deprivation, the Court required the imposition of procedural safe-
guards.41
Although the analysis used in Goss follows logically from the
approach developed in the earlier procedural due process cases, the
40. Id. at 576, citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n.8 (1972); Bod-
die v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395
U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring). But see text accompanying notes 48-
54 infra for a critique of the Court's authorities.
41. 419 U.S. at 576. Mr. Justice Powell, speaking for the four dissenters, sharply
disagreed with the majority's interpretation of prior case law. He first contended that
the students had no right to an education apart from the entire package of statutory pro-
visions governing education in Ohio. The legislation which established the right to free
education, Justice Powell noted, also explicitly authorized a principal to suspend a stu-
dent for up to ten days. Omo Rv. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.48, 3313.64, 3313.66 (Page
1972). He attempted to distinguish this case from Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134
(1974), where although the three-Justice plurality held that the employee had no consti-
tutionally protected entitlement to continued employment, six Justices disagreed and
found that the employee did have such an entitlement. Two of those six Justices, how-
ever, including Justice Powell, concurred in the result that no hearing was required on
the ground that the post-termination hearing granted the employee, in addition to provi-
sions for reinstatement and back pay, were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due
process.
In Goss, Justice Powell sought to distinguish his earlier position in Arnett on the
basis of the respective legislative views of the statutory property interests involved in
the two cases. In Arnett, he noted, it had been possible to infer a clear congressional
intent to create a substantial property interest from the presence of a statutory require-
ment of a showing of "cause" before employment could be terminated. In the Goss sit-
uation, however, he found no evidence that the Ohio legislature had intended to impose
a cause requirement on the temporary suspension of students. He therefore refused to
infer a legislative concern with the seriousness of the property interest involved compar-
able to the concern apparent in Arnett. He concluded that the Goss majority, in impli-
edly relying on the Arnett analogy, had "disregard[ed] the basic structure of Ohio law."
419 U.S. at 587 n.4.
Justice Powell argued in the alternative that even if the students had an unqualified
property interest in education, they had not suffered an injury of constitutional dimen-
sion. Taking issue with the majority, he interpreted the prior case law as supporting,
rather than refuting, the view that "the Due Process Clause applies only where a 'severe
detriment or a grievous loss' had occurred." Id. at 587-88. Justice Powell summarized
his position by quoting from Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), decided on the
same day as Roth and Perry, in which the Court reiterated its standard for analyzing
due process claims:
"Whether any procedural protections are due depends on the extent to which
an individual will be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss.' Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring), quoted in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970)." Mor-
issey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (emphasis supplied).
419 U.S. at 58.
416
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opinion reflects a significant departure from that analysis, both in terms
of the requirement of a legitimate claim of entitlement and the need to
establish a serious deprivation. To begin with, while the students were
clearly "entitled" to an education under state law, the Court's opinion of
the nature of the property interest at stake appears inconsistent with the
notion articulated in Arnett that the source of the entitlement may also
qualify its availability. The Ohio statute which created the system of
public education also explicitly provided as part of that system the
mechanism for internal student discipline which resulted in the suspen-
sions.42 Relying on the plurality opinion in Arnett, the defendant
argued that this legislation must be read as a whole, and thus that the
entitlement to an education which otherwise existed was qualified by the
right of the school authorities to suspend students for disciplinary rea-
sons according to the procedures prescribed in the statute.43
The argument fails when scrutinized through the same type of
analysis that made six Justices take exception with the plurality's opin-
ion in Arnett. Under the plurality's approach, whatever the nature of
the individual's statutorily created property interest, that interest can be
extinguished, without notice or a hearing, merely by complying with
those procedures set forth by the legislature.44 But the right to proce-
dural due process is conferred by the Constitution, not the legislature.
While the legislature may elect not to grant a property interest in the
first place, once it does grant such an interest, it may not authorize its
deprivation without adherence to the minimal procedural safeguards
required by the Constitution.45 In Goss, the Court perceived that once
the Ohio legislature extended the right to free education, it could not
constitutionally withdraw that right in the absence of appropriate proce-
dural safeguards.
Nevertheless, the Goss majority's approach to the question creates
difficulty by introducing a new element into the analysis. The Court
failed to pay any regard to the legislature's intent in enacting the statute,
and judicially mandated the dimension of the interest at stake. In this
respect, Goss departs from that portion of the analysis adopted by all
the Justices in Arnett, which included a determination that Congress
had intended to confer some type of entitlement on the government
employee who claimed the unconstitutional deprivation.4 8  While it is
42. OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.48, 3313.64, 3313.66 (Page 1972).
43. 419 U.S. at 573-74.
44. 416 U.S. at 166-67 (Powell, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 167.
46. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S 134, 159-62 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., announcing the
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likely that, faced with the alternative of giving education free of all
restrictions or providing no benefit at all, the Ohio legislature would
have opted for the former, the Court should at least have made the
inquiry. The effect of Goss may be to promote the discovery in various
statutes of property interests which a legislature did not intend to create,
with the result that procedural protections will be improperly extended
to the recipients of these newly discovered benefits. An immediate
impact of Goss will undoubtedly be to encourage a trend already evident
in the area of publicly subsidized housing, the practice of finding that
tenants have a "property" right in such housing and therefore must be
afforded trial-type hearings prior to FHA approval of rent increases,
despite the fact that Congress arguably did not intend to confer an
unqualified right to housing when it enacted the federal housing legisla-
tion.47
The Court's adoption of the de minimis standard also significantly
changes the analysis developed in the earlier due process cases. Though
claimed to be supported by existing case law, the standard does not have
as strong a foundation as the Court suggested. The only prior holding
in which outright approval for the standard arguably can be found is
Fuentes v. Shevin.4" There, in a footnote,49 the Court merely quoted
from a concurring opinion in its earlier decision in Sniadach v. Family
judgment of the Court, joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart, J.); id. at 166 (Powell, L,
joined by Blackmun, J., concurring in part); id. at 171-72, 181 (White, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); id. at 206-07, 209 (Marshall, J., joined by Douglas and
Brennan, JJ., dissenting). The nine Justices agreed that the Lloyd-La Follette Act, 5
U.S.C. § 7501 (1970), guaranteed a nonprobationary employee continued employment
absent "cause"; their disagreement was over the extent of the property right and the type
of procedural protection to be afforded.
47. Compare Langevin v. Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296, 301 (2d Cir. 1971),
and Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1246 (1st Cir. 1970), with Geneva Towers Ten-
ants Organization v. Federated Mortgage Investors, 504 F.2d 483, 489-90 (9th Cir.
1974), and Marshall v. Lynn, 497 F.2d 643, 645-48 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In Langevin,
the court refused to find a protected property right, noting that the purpose of the Na-
tional Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 17151 (1970), was to promote "the construction of
housing by private enterprise," 447 F.2d at 301, quoting S. REp. No. 281, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1961), and that Congress could not have intended to confer any such right
since it "might well kill the goose in 'solicitude for the eggs."' 447 F.2d at 301, quoting
Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1246 (1st Cir. 1970). Interpreting the same statute,
the courts in Geneva Towers and Marshall found a protected property right to exist and
thus required trial-type hearings.
48. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
49. Id. at 90 n.21. Even in Fuentes, while the de minimis language was hidden
within the footnote, the text spoke of invoking the procedural protection of the four-
teenth amendment where there was "[amny significant taking of property," Id. at 86, or
when a "significant property interest is at stake." Id. at 87.
(Vol. 1976:409
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Finance Corp.50 which stated that if the "deprivation cannot be char-
acterized as de minimis, the individual must be accorded the usual
requisites of procedural due process: notice and a prior hearing."5' The
de minimis standard was not mentioned by the Court again until Goss.
Neither Boddie v. Connecticut52 nor Board of Regents v. Roth,5 3 also
cited by the Goss Court in support of its position,54 made specific
reference to such a standard.
Nevertheless, the adoption of the de minimis standard seems to
follow logically from the point made in the earlier cases, in particular
Roth, that it is the nature of the interest at stake, and not its weight, that
determines whether the due process clause applies. 55 By separating the
severity of the deprivation from any determination of the applicability of
due process, the Court has placed itself in the position of neces-
sarily demanding some procedural safeguards in any instance of measur-
able deprivation of a protected interest. In this respect, Goss merely
represents a reaffirmation of the principle set forth in Roth.
The problem with this approach, however, is that Goss seems to
have abandoned any restriction on the applicability of procedural due
process. Although the standard is logically rooted in the language of
Roth, its unqualified adoption reflects a departure from the practice in
Roth and other pre-Goss decisions of limiting the extent of the interests
protected within the property classification.56 Since Goss requires no
balancing of competing governmental and private interests at the initial
stage of determining whether a property right exists, and essentially no
limitation on the membership of the property class itself, there appears
to be virtually no floor beneath which a hearing need not be provided.
As Judge Friendly noted in a recent article, after Goss the question is
"whether government can do anything to a citizen without affording him
'some kind of hearing.' "5T
Liberty Interests
Having noted that Goss mandates the application of a de minimis
standard to determine whether a protected property right exists, one
50. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
51. Id. at 342 (Harlan, J., concurring).
52. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
53. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
54. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
55. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972).
56. See text accompanying notes 22-25 supra.
57. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1267, 1275 (1975).
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would suspect that a similar test would apply to liberty interests. The
cases prior to Goss delineated two situations in which harm to a person's
liberty interest requires due process safeguards: (1) where the govern-
ment has made charges against the individual which might seriously
damage his standing and associations within his community, or which
threaten his good name, reputation, honor, or integrity,58 and (2) where
the state imposes a stigma or other disability upon the individual that
forecloses his freedom to take advantage of future employment oppor-
tunities.50 In either situation there was a requirement, as with the
property interest, that the harm to the liberty interest be "serious" before
the procedural protections would become applicable.
Despite its decision concerning protected property interests, how-
ever, the Court in Goss does not seem to have adopted a de minimis test
for liberty interests. In finding that the suspensions had deprived the
58. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972); see, e.g., Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (posting of individual's name as an alcoholic);
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (discharge from public service on disloyalty
grounds); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (desig-
nation as Communist organization).
However, in Paul v. Davis, 44 U.S.L.W. 4337 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1976), a case decided
since Goss, the Court appears to have retreated from this position. In Paul a photo-
graph of the respondent bearing his name was included in a police flyer of "active
shoplifters" distributed to area merchants. The respondent had been arrested on a shop-
lifting charge, but the charge had been dropped. In reinstating the district court's dis-
missal of the suit, Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, stated that damage
to a person's reputation without accompanying damage to a more tangible interest such
as employment, does not support a claim cognizable under section 1983. The Court
held that the defamation, standing alone, did not deprive respondent of any "liberty"
protected by the procedural guarantees of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 4343. The
Court reached its decision even though it accepted as true respondent's allegations that
dissemination of the flyer would inhibit him from entering stores for fear of being
suspected of shoplifting, and would seriously impair his future employment opportunities.
Id. at 4338.
In a sharply worded dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the majority opinion
"water[s] down" precedents which established that a person's interest in his good name
and reputation is protected as a "liberty" interest, by now reinterpreting them as lim-
ited to "injury to reputation that affects an individual's employment prospects or, as
'a right or status previously recognized by state law [that the State] distinctly altered
or extinguished."' Id. at 4349. The dissent then added that even under this analysis
the "active shoplifter" label had affected tangible interests of respondent by seriously
impairing his future employment opportunities. Id. at 4350.
59. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1972); see, e.g., Willner v.
Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (denial of admission to bar be-
cause of adverse statements concerning applicant's moral character); Schware v. Board
of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (denial of admission to bar on basis of prior
membership in Communist Party); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 3F3 (1915) (statute limiting
aliens' right to work). See also'Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123 (1951).
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students of a protected liberty interest, the Court noted that the charges
for which the students had been suspended could "seriously damage the
students' standing with their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as
interfere with later opportunities for higher education and employ-
ment."6  Although it is difficult to tell from the Courts cursory treat-
ment of the issue, this language suggests that the harm to a liberty
interest must reach a certain level of seriousness--something greater
than a de minimis deprivation-before due process protections will
apply.
The Court's apparent reluctance to adopt a de minimis standard
for liberty interests is justifiable. Such a standard might well result in a
hearing every time the government takes a position adverse to that of an
individual. In the field of civil employment for example, "[nlearly
any reason assigned for dismissal is likely to be to some extent a negative
reflection on an individual's ability, temperament or character." 61 Ap-
plication of the de minimis standard in these instances would arguably
require a due process hearing whenever a government employee, per-
haps even a probationary employee, is discharged. Furthermore, the
adoption of such a standard would seem plainly inconsistent with the
Court's most recent procedural due process cases. For instance, Board
of Regents v. Roth,62 in whioh the Court rejected the claim that Roth
had suffered damage to a protected liberty interest, is certainly wrongly
decided if a de minimis standard is applied. Although the Court could
60. 419 U.S. at 574-75. Justice Powell in his dissent did not feel that the students
could claim the sufficient reputational injury to require constitutional protections. Id.
at 589.
The Court might well have followed the lead of the three-judge district court be-
low and decided the case exclusively upon the liberty interest ground, thus avoid-
ing the seemingly more difficult issue of whether the students' interest in public educa-
tion was a protected property interest. Factual evidence presented by the appellees
might have been sufficient to justify a finding of a serious "stigmatizing" effect on the
student. Brief for Appellees at 21-22, 34-35. Instead, the Court placed principal reli-
ance on the property interest aspect of the case. See notes 38-41 supra and accompany-
ing text.
61. Gray v. Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir.
1975); accord, Jenkins v. United States Post Office, 475 F.2d 1256, 1257 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973). The court in Gray refused to require a hearing for
a dismissed teacher on the ground that the constitutional concern was only with the type
of stigma that seriously damages an individual's opportunity to seek employment else-
where. 520 F.2d at 806. A similar approach was recently adopted by the Tenth Circuit
in Weathers v. West Yuma County School Dist., No. 75-1134 (10th Cir. Feb. 25, 1976).
The court held that the nonrenewal of a teaching contract and the reasons therefor, if
communicated, while likely to make appellant "less attractive" to future employers, were
insufficient to establish a liberty interest. Id. at 11.
62. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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find no evidence that Roth's nonretention would have a "substantial
adverse effect" on his future employment prospects, 3 it did acknowl-
edge that it would have some effect.0 4 Under a de minimis standard, a
sufficient threat of harm would have resulted from the nonretention to
require imposition of procedural safeguards.
In sum, the result of the Court's approach in Goss is to impose a
dual standard for making the determination of whether a protected
interest is involved in a procedural due process case. In one sense, this
result is understandable: while the unqualified acceptance of a de
minimis standard for property interests may be open to question, clearly
the endorsement of a similar test for liberty interests could not be
justified.
WHAT KIND OF HPAPING
The Goss opinion also invites new questions on the issue of the
type of procedures which the due process clause mandates. The Su-
preme Court has often recognized the need for different kinds of
procedures in varying situations or circumstances, 65 since "[t]he very
nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures
universally applicable to every imaginable situation." 66 The degree of
procedural protection required is determined by balancing the import-
ance of the private interest affected by the proposed governmental action
against the government's interest in summary adjudication.Y The ap-
plication of this principle is well illustrated by the Court's opinion in
Wolff v. McDonnell.68 In discussing the type of hearing to be afforded
a prison inmate before disciplinary action could be taken, the Court
stated that "it is immediately apparent that one cannot automatically
apply procedural rules designed for free citizens in an open society, or
for parolees or probationers under only limited restraints, to the very
63. Id. at 573-75 & n.13.
64. Id. at 573 n.13.
65. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prison officials required
to give inmates prior notice of disciplinary proceedings and "written statement by the
factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons" for disciplinary decision); Morris-
sey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (due process requirements for parole revocation in-
clude preliminary inquiry to determine whether there are reasonable grounds to believe
parole violation has occurred and, as soon after the parolee's arrest as is reasonable, for-
mal revocation hearing); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare officials are
required to provide recipient an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of welfare bene-
fits).
66. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
67. Id. See generally Friendly, supra note 57.
68. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
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different situation presented by a disciplinary proceeding in a state
prison.6 9
Applying this flexible approach in Goss, the Court demanded only
that the student be given notice of the actions of which he was accused,
an explanation of the basis for the accusation, and, as a general rule, an
informal hearing held prior to the suspension which would permit the
student to offer his version of the events.70 The Court explicitly stated
that a full-fledged, trial-type evidentiary hearing need not be provided,
and recognized that to impose even truncated trial proceedings would
overwhelm administrative facilities, placing on them costly burdens and
complicating the suspension process to a point where its cost would
outweigh its utility as a disciplinary tool.7 1
While the Court's failure to demand more stringent protections
may reflect a justifiable reluctance to involve the judiciary in the routine
management of a public school,72 it may have provided for "hearings"
that are meaningless. 7  There have, of course, been other cases where
less than trial-type hearings have been provided, a result which follows
naturally from the basic premise that due process is a flexible concept,
with the type of procedures required in each instance dependent on
striking a balance among the competing interests at stake. Nonetheless,
these cases also make it clear that the procedure afforded in every
instance must be "meaningful." 74 The rudimentary procedures provided
in Goss, where the students only defense would -be his own testimony,
with no right to confront or cross-examine adverse witnesses, to call his
69. Id. at 560.
70. 419 U.S. at 581.
71. Id. at 583.
72. But see N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1975, at 1, col 1 (South Boston High School
placed under direction of court officer).
73. The very limited procedural safeguards mandated by the Goss Court were, in
some instances, less stringent than those already provided by Ohio law. 419 U.S. at
596 (Powell, J., dissenting). The Ohio statute, Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.66 (Page
1972), provided for written notification of the suspension to the student's parent or
guardian within twenty-four hours of any suspension, including the "reasons therefor."
Moreover, an informal procedure at one of the high schools involved provided that, if
the misconduct occurred in the presence of a teacher, the teacher would describe the
misconduct in writing and would then send the student and the writing to the principal's
office. After listening to the student's version of the events, the principal would attempt
to resolve the discrepancies in the presence of both teacher and student. If conflict re-
mained, the teacher's version would be accepted. 419 U.S. at 568 n.2.
74. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545, 552 (1965). The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity
to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Id.; see Grannis v.
Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
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own witnesses, or to present other evidence,75 do not appear to meet
this requirement.
More importantly, the Court's endorsement of such minimal safe-
guards threatens to dilute the procedural protection which the due
process clause affords in other areas by encouraging the view that this
right is not to be taken seriously." In balancing the competing interests
to determine what type of hearing is required by the due process clause
in a particular case, a court may be tempted to relax the procedural
safeguards it imposes below a level it otherwise would have considered
the absolute minimum required by due process. If the cost of providing
the protections outweighs the incremental increase in the nature of the
afforded protection, or if the governmental action causing injury to the
individual is viewed as producing more benefit to the general public
than harm to the individual, due process could mean very little to a
court. Yet it is in precisely these instances where the individual's rights
are threatened by actions allegedly for the general good that the individ-
ual needs the greatest protection.7
The same warning was recently voiced in Geneva Towers Tenant
Organization v. Federated Mortgage Investors, 7 8 in which the Ninth
75. 419 U.S. at 581.
76. See Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 1974, 27 AD. L. Ruv. 113, 125
(1975); Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on
the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARv. L. R~v. 1510, 1527 (1975). Mr. Justice Harlan
in his concurrence in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 44 (1963), made reference to a
similar problem in defining the standards to be applied to state searches and seizures.
In that instance, he thought that the Court, by relaxing the fourth amendment in order
to avoid unduly fettering the states, would cause an ultimate dilution of the higher stand-
ards applicable to the federal government. Id. at 45-46. In Goss, the Court, by accom-
modating the school administration's need for summary adjudication, may have spawned
a general relaxation of procedural due process safeguards in other areas. See also
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-39 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387
U.S. 541 (1967) (Court relaxed probable cause standard to accommodate requirement
of warrant prior to administrative search). Various commentators have questioned
whether Camara and See have in fact advanced the protection of individual rights, see,
e.g., LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Camara and
See Cases, 1967 Sup. Cr. REv. 1, 37, while others have worried about the dilution ef-
fect. See, e.g., Comment, Administrative Inspection Procedures and the Fourth Amend-
ment-Administrative Probable Cause, 32 ALBANY L Rav. 155, 164-65, 171-72 (1967);
17 BUFFALO L. REV. 914, 924 (1968).
77. This point is graphically illustrated in Goss, where the Court accepted admin-
istrative costs as a valid justification for withholding greater procedural protection. 419
U.S. at 583. See also Friendly, supra note 57, at 1276; Note, Specifying the Procedures
Required by Due Process, supra note 76, at 1527 (criticizes judiciary for employing "in-
terest balancing" doctrine, arguing that use of utilitarian balancing "effectively abandons
any limits on total power of government to injure the individual").
78. 504 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1974).
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Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the federal Housing Act79 as
expressing a congressional intent to create a protected property interest
under the due process clause in favor of tenants of public housing.80
Some kind of hearings' was, therefore, mandated prior to FHA approval
and implementation of proposed rent increases. Faced with the pros-
pect of providing hearings for a potentially large class, the court limited
the opportunity to be heard: notice was to be given prior to the
proposed rent increase, tenants were to be given the opportunity to make
written objections, and the FHA was to provide a concise statement of
reasons for its actions.8 2 The determination of those instances in which
the dictates of fairness would require an opportunity for limited oral
presentations, including the right to examine and cross-examine witness-
es, was left to the full discretion of the hearing officer.8 3 Judge Huf-
stedler, in dissent, challenged these procedures, noting that the court "in
the guise of granting due process . . . eviscerates the due process
protections that it purports to grant."84 She further charged the majori-
ty with reducing "[tihe great procedural protections of due process . . .
to little more than a right to send and receive mail."85
79. 12 U.S.C. § 17151 (1970).
80. 504 F.2d at 488-90; accord, Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626, 638-39
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Marshall v. Lynn, 497 F.2d 643, 645-48 (D.C. Cir. 1973); cf. Burr
v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 479 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1973) (same
result regarding municipally funded housing); Ponce v. Housing Authority, 389 F. Supp.
635, 648-49 (E.D. Cal. 1975) (farm labor housing funded through Farmers Home Ad-
ministration). But see Paulsen v. Coachlight Apartment Co., 507 F.2d 401 (6th Cir.
1974); Langevin v. Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296, 301 (2d Cir. 1971); Hahn v.
Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1246-49 (1st Cir. 1970); People's Rights Organization v. Beth-
lehem Associates, 356 F. Supp. 407, 411-13 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 487 F.2d 1395 (3d Cir.
1973). Criticism of the courts' decisions finding an entitlement to low rents can be
found in the first part of Judge Hufstedler's dissent in Geneva Towers. 504 F.2d at
493-98.
81. The term "hearing" has been defined by Professor Davis as "any oral proceed-
ing before a tribunal." K. DAvis, TEXr, supra note 19, § 7.01, at 157. This definition
has been challenged by Judge Friendly as being too narrow, however, because of its
failure to include circumstances where only written materials are presented. Friendly,
supra note 57, at 1270. Under a broader definition, the type of proceedings provided
in Geneva Towers and the other housing cases could be classified as hearings.
82. 504 F.2d at 491-92; accord, Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626, 640-41
(D.C. Cir. 1973); cf. Burr v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 479 F.2d
1165, 1169-70 (2d Cir. 1973). The Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, while still disputing the tenants' constitutional right to be heard on rent
increases, has recently promulgated regulations which give the tenants a statutory right
to procedures similar to those provided in Geneva Towers, Thompson, and Burr. 24
C.F.R. §§ 410.71-74 (1975).
83. See Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 629, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
84. 504 F.2d at 498 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
85. Id.
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But while Geneva Towers extended to tenants less than what Judge
Hufstedler labeled the "barest of minimums"' 6 in due process safe-
guards, it does not pose nearly so great a potential for dilution of due
process as does Goss. To begin with, the safeguards afforded each
individual tenant in Geneva Towers seem to be much more protective
than those afforded the students in Goss. In addition, Geneva Towers,
and cases like it, do not deal with the statutory rights of any individual;
the deprivation involved is common to a large group of persons, and
there is no fact situation unique to any individual. Thus, these kinds of
cases may easily be distinguished on the ground that the common
questions involved make it permissible to limit the protection afforded
each individual in order to achieve adequate protection for the group.
There is a significant difference between the Geneva Towers-type case
and most due process cases which concern the deprivation of a particu-
lar individual's rights. In the latter, government action is taken on the
basis of facts different for each person involved, and hence a procedure
designed to bring out such facts in each individual case would seem to
be essential.8 7
Goss may also have a diluting effect on the general rule established
by the earlier decisions that due process requires a hearing of some kind
86. Id. Judge Hufstedler identifies the "barest of minimums" as "not only adequate
prior notice but also a meaningful evidentiary hearing with a right to personal appear-
ance and a right to call and to examine witnesses as well as to present documentary
evidence." Id.
87. Of course, less than full trial-type hearings have been sanctioned by the Court
in cases where there has been injury only to a particular individual's rights. But in these
cases, the countervailing governmental interests were very different from the administra-
tive convenience interests present in Gross. For example, in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974), the Court expressed a fear that permitting a prison inmate who faces
disciplinary proceedings to call witnesses, present documentary evidence, or confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses might seriously threaten the security of the institution
by creating the risk of reprisals against such witnesses or by increasing the potential for
disruption. 418 U.S. at 566-69. Similarly, in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), the Court denied a claim for a due process hearing
because of the government's need for unfettered control of the internal operations of a
national security installation.
In Cafeteria Workers, a cafeteria cook for a private concessionaire on a military
installation challenged the actions of the base commander, who denied her future access
to the base for security reasons. The Court found no violation of due process even
though such denial of access was effected without advising the employee of the specific
grounds for her exclusion, or providing her with an opportunity to contest the charge.
367 U.S. at 894-99. The case has undergone recent criticism because of its denial of
any type of hearing. McNeill v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314, 323-25 (4th Cir. 1973). More-
over, because the case was decided under the "balancing of interests" approach to ap-
plicability of the due process clause, rather than under the two-step analysis of Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), its continued validity is suspect.
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prior to the deprivation.8 Encouraged by the Court's decision to
extend only minimal safeguards to the suspended students because of its
desire not to impose procedures that would be unduly burdensome to
the school's administration, the lower courts may be more willing to
accept government arguments concerning the need to protect the public
purse or to maintain an orderly functioning system as justification for
demanding only post-action hearings.8
Several lower courts would find this interpretation of Goss entirely
consistent with the position they took prior to Goss that in the absence
of "brutal need," government interests would normally outweigh the
individual's claim to a pre-deprivation hearing.90 Principal reliance for
88. E.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 88-89 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535, 542 (1971). Of course, the Goss Court's decision also made it clear that "there
are recurring situations in which prior notice and hearing cannot be insisted upon." 419
U.S. at 582. Postponement of notice and hearing until after the deprivation has been
sanctioned by the Court in cases where summary administrative action was necessary
to protect the public from contaminated food, North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chi-
cago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908); misbranded drugs, Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc.,
339 U.S. 594 (1950); bank failures, Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Coffin
Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928); and rapidly rising rents, Bowles v. Willing-
ham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944), and prices, Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944),
in wartime. Where there is a great risk of harm to the public, and the infringement of
the private interest is less important, the Court will likely allow summary action pend-
ing a later hearing. See R.A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d 127, 131 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962). The Court has also recognized the need of the gov-
ernment to secure its revenues promptly, Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931);
Cheatham v. United States, 92 U.S. 85 (1875), or to seize property before it is removed
from the jurisdiction, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679
(1974), so long as adequate opportunity is afforded for later judicial determination.
In a recent case, Justice Brennan listed three criteria used in determining whether
the due process clause would permit governmental action prior to a hearing: "where (1)
the seizure is necessary to protect an important governmental or public interest, (2)
there is a 'special need for very prompt action,' and (3) 'the standards of a narrowly
drawn statute' require that an official determine that the particular seizure is both neces-
sary and justified." Laing v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 473, 487 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
89. See, e.g., Frost v. Weinberger, 515 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1975) (reduction of surviv-
ors' benefits paid to deceased's spouse and dependent children); Hubel v. West Virginia
Racing Comm'n, 513 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1975) (suspension of horse owner's and train-
er's permits pending investigation of "doping" charges); Haverhill Manor, Inc. v. Com-
missioner of Pub. Welfare, - Mass. -, 330 N.E.2d 180, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 277
(1975) (deduction of alleged overpayments for health care benefits from sum owed to
nursing home).
90. See, e.g., Brubaker v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 973, 988-89 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Davis v. Vandiver, 494 F.2d 830, 832 (5th Cir.
1974); Eley v. Morris, 390 F. Supp. 913, 920 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Russi v. Weinberger,
373 F. Supp. 1349, 1352-53 (ED. Va. 1974); Torres v. New York State Dep't of Labor,
321 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated and remanded, 402 U.S. 968, adhered to, 333 F.
Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 949 (1972).
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this view was placed on the opinion in Goldberg v. Kelly,91 where the
Supreme Court, in holding that a pre-deprivation hearing was required
before welfare benefits could be terminated, repeatedly emphasized the
unique position of the recipient with regard to the seriousness of the
deprivation.92 As long as irreparable injury did not occur, and provi-
sions were made to enable the individual to receive retroactively all
benefits to which he was entitled, the courts were willing to uphold
administrative procedures which provided for hearings scheduled imme-
diately, or with all feasible speed, after the deprivation.93
It should be noted, however, that not all the lower court decisions
since Goss have adopted this view. In addition to those courts which
had followed Goldberg prior to Goss, there were other courts94 which
had come to the conclusion that prior hearings were mandated by the
due process clause in the absence of extraordinary conditions. Empha-
sis was placed in part on the Supreme Court's opinion in Fuentes v.
Shevin,9 1 where it was noted that "[tihe right to a prior hearing has
91. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Many of the courts also relied heavily on Arnett v. Ken-
nedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), in which the Supreme Court, by a vote of 5-4, upheld the
discharge of a nonprobationary federal employee who was not provided with a preter-
ruination hearing. But because of the divided vote, and the fact that none of the five
separate opinions filed commanded more than the vote of three Justices, the rationale
of the case is unclear and its precedential value is limited.
92. "While post-termination review is relevant, there is one overpowering fact
which controls here. By hypothesis, a welfare recipient is destitute, without
funds or assets .... Suffice it to say that to cut off a welfare recipient in
the face of . . . 'brutal need' without a prior hearing of some sort is un-
conscionable, unless overwhelming considerations justify it .... Against
the justified desire to protect public funds must be weighed the individual's
overpowering need in this unique situation, not to be wrongfully deprived.of
assistance .. . ." 397 U.S. at 261, quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp.
893, 899, 900, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (three-judge district court opinion in the
same case).
93. See Alsbury v. United States Postal Serv., No. 75-2138 (9th Cir. Mar. 1, 1976);
Frost v. Weinberger, 515 F.2d 57, 67-68 (2d Cir. 1975); Russi v. Weinberger, 373 F.
Supp. 1349, 1352-53 (E.D. Va. 1974). The Supreme Court seems to have reached the
same conclusion in its recent decision in Mathews v. Eldridge, 96 S. Ct. 893
(1976). In assessing what process is due a disabled worker prior to termination
of his disability benefit, the Court stated that "substantial weight must be given to the
good-faith judgments of the [officials] . . .that the procedures they have provided as-
sure fair consideration of the entitlement claims of individuals." Id. at 4233.
94. See, e.g., T.A. Moynahan Properties, Inc. v. Lancaster Village Cooperative, 496
F.2d 1114, 1118 (7th Cir. 1974); Weiss v. Burr, 484 F.2d 973, 985 n.24 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1161 (1974); Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 358 F. Supp. 430, 434
(E.D. Pa. 1973), vacated and remanded, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974), vacated, 421 U.S.
983 (1975). But see Peacock v. Board of Regents, 510 F.2d 1324, 1328 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1049 (1975) (Ninth Circuit read Supreme Court decisions in
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), and Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134 (1974), as rejecting any presumption in favor of prior hearing).
95. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
long been recognized by this Court under the Fourteenth and Fifth
Amendments."96 Acknowledging the flexibility of due process as to the
form of the hearing, the Court insisted in Fuentes that the hearing be
provided before the deprivation at issue takes effect. Only in extraordi-
nary cases would the Court permit postponing the hearing until after the
event.97  This latter group of courts-those which followed Fuentes-
has interpreted Goss as supportive of their position.98 Goss has been
viewed as standing for the proposition that the relative weight of the
deprivation is not one of the factors to be considered in deciding
whether a prior hearing is required.99
The significance of these cases, however, must be discounted to
some extent. In the first place, all have dealt with proceedings to
recover overpayment of benefits to individuals under the Social Security
Act, and the courts gave substantial weight to the significant rate of
reversal of initial administrative determinations that overpayment has
occurred and the long delay between the initiation of recoupment and
the hearing.10° Moreover, Goss itself noted that "the timing and con-
tent of the notice and the nature of the hearing will depend on appropri-
ate accommodation of the competing interests involved,"''1 thus sug-
gesting that due process does not always demand a prior hearing.1
0 2
96. Id. at 82. See also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971).
97. 407 U.S. at 82.
98. See, e.g., Elliott v. Weinberger, No. 74-1611 (9th Cir. Oct. 1, 1975); Mattern
v. Weinberger, 519 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1975).
99. See Elliott v. Weinberger, No. 74-1611, at 20-21 (9th Cir. Oct. 1, 1975); Mat-
tern v. Weinberger, 519 F.2d 150, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1975). The latter court read Goss
as "requiring prior hearings whenever the impact is more than de minimis." Id. at 164.
100. Elliott v. Weinberger, No. 74-1611, at 19-20 (9th Cir. Oct. 1, 1975); Mattern
v. Weinberger, 519 F.2d 150, 161 (3d Cir. 1975).
101. 419 U S. at 579 (emphasis added). The court in Hubel v. West Virginia Racing
Comm'n, 513 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1975), quoted this language from Goss, id. at 243,
when it held that the state's interest in guarding the purity of horse racing, protecting
the patrons from fixed races, and ensuring the humane treatment of the animals out-
weighed an owner's and trainer's right to hearings prior to the suspension of their per-
mits to engage in racing pending investigation of "doping" charges.
102. The same reading of the Constitution comes from cases following Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). See Morgan v. Fletcher, 518 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1975);
McFarland v. United States, 517 F.2d 938 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
In its latest procedural due process decision, the Court, in light of elaborate pro-
cedures for pre- and post-termination administrative consideration, post-termination judi-
cial review, and provisions for full retroactive relief if the individual ultimately prevails,
rejected a claim that the due process clause requires an evidentiary hearing prior to the
termination of Social Security disability payments. Mathews v. Eldridge, 96 S.
Ct. 893 (1976). In reversing the Fourth Circuit's decision, the Court seemed
to return to the "brutal need" standard when it compared the hardship imposed upon
an erroneously terminated disabled worker with that of the welfare recipient in Gold-
berg. Id. at 4231.
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CONCLUSION
This Note has focused on the ramifications flowing from the
Supreme Court's decision in Goss v. Lopez.103 Although the analysis
adopted by the Court follows logically from that developed in its earlier
procedural due process decisions, that analysis has been advanced in at
least three significant respects. First, in making the initial determina-
tion whether a protected property interest exists, the intent of the
legislature to limit the availability of the entitlement conferred by a
particular statute has apparently become irrelevant. Second, the Court's
adoption of the de minimis standard has virtually eliminated the floor
beneath which a hearing need not be provided, at least for deprivations
of property rights. Finally, the Court's adoption of such minimal
procedural safeguards because of its reluctance to impose procedures
that are unduly burdensome on administrators threatens to dilute the
protection the due process clause affords in other areas by fostering the
view that this right is not to be taken seriously and by encouraging lower
courts to accept government justifications for providing only post-action
hearings.
Goss will undoubtedly have a substantial impact on how and when
an administrator will be required to provide a due process hear-
ing. Beyond this obvious observation, however, it is difficult to foresee
"the ultimate frontiers of the new 'thicket.' "104
103. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
104. Id. at 597 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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